CACI No. 3063. Acts of Violence - Ralph Act - Essential Factual Elements (Civ. Code, § 51.7)
Judicial Council of California Civil Jury Instructions (2025 edition)
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3063.Acts of Violence - Ralph Act - Essential Factual Elements
(Civ. Code, § 51.7)
[Name of plaintiff] claims that [name of defendant] committed an act of
violence against [him/her/nonbinary pronoun] because of
[his/her/nonbinary pronoun] [race/color/religion/ancestry/national origin/
political affiliation/sex/sexual
orientation/age/disability/citizenship/primary language/immigration
status/position in a labor dispute/[insert other actionable characteristic]].
To establish this claim, [name of plaintiff] must prove all of the following:
1. That [name of defendant] committed a violent act against [name of
plaintiff] [or [his/her/nonbinary pronoun] property];
2. That a substantial motivating reason for [name of defendant]’s
conduct was [[his/her/nonbinary pronoun] perception of] [name of
plaintiff]’s [race/color/religion/ancestry/national origin/political
affiliation/sex/sexual orientation/age/disability/citizenship/primary
language/immigration status/position in a labor dispute/[insert
other actionable characteristic]];
3. That [name of plaintiff] was harmed; and
4. That [name of defendant]’s conduct was a substantial factor in
causing [name of plaintiff]’s harm.
Derived from former CACI No. 3023 December 2009; Renumbered from CACI No.
3023A December 2012; Revised June 2013, December 2016
Directions for Use
Use this instruction for a cause of action under the Ralph Act involving actual acts
of violence alleged to have been committed by the defendant against the plaintiff.
For an instruction involving only threats of violence, see CACI No. 3064, Threats of
Violence - Ralph Act - Essential Factual Elements.
Note that element 2 uses the term “substantial motivating reason” to express both
intent and causation between the protected classification and the defendant’s acts.
“Substantial motivating reason” has been held to be the appropriate standard under
the Fair Employment and Housing Act to address the possibility of both
discriminatory and nondiscriminatory motives. (See Harris v. City of Santa Monica
(2013) 56 Cal.4th 203, 232 [152 Cal.Rptr.3d 392, 294 P.3d 49]; CACI No. 2507,
“Substantial Motivating Reason” Explained.) Whether the FEHA standard applies
under the Ralph Act has not been addressed by the courts.
Liability may also be found if a defendant “aids, incites, or conspires” in the denial
of a right protected under Civil Code section 51.7. (Civ. Code, § 52(b).) This
instruction should be modified if aiding, inciting, or conspiring is asserted as
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theories of liability. See also instructions in the Conspiracy series (CACI No. 3600
et seq.).
Sources and Authority
• Ralph Act. Civil Code section 51.7.
• Protected Characteristics. Civil Code section 51(b).
• Remedies Under Ralph Act. Civil Code section 52(b).
• “The unambiguous language of this section gives rise to a cause of action in
favor of a person against whom violence or intimidation has been committed or
threatened.” (Coon v. Joseph (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 1269, 1277 [237 Cal.Rptr.
873].)
• “Under the Ralph Act, a plaintiff must establish the defendant threatened or
committed violent acts against the plaintiff or their property, and a motivating
reason for doing so was a prohibited discriminatory motive, or that [defendant]
aided, incited, or conspired in the denial of a protected right.” (Gabrielle A. v.
County of Orange (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 1268, 1291 [217 Cal.Rptr.3d 275].)
• “Nor do we agree with defendants that ‘because of’ logically means ‘hatred.’
Section 51.7 provides that all persons ‘have the right to be free from any
violence, or intimidation by threat of violence, committed against their persons
or property because of . . .’ specified characteristics, including sex, and provides
for a civil remedy for violation of that right. Nothing in the statute requires that
a plaintiff prove that the offending act was motivated by hate.” (Ventura v. ABM
Industries Inc. (2012) 212 Cal.App.4th 258, 269 [150 Cal.Rptr.3d 861].)
• “Section 51 by its express language applies only within California. It cannot
(with its companion penalty provisions in § 52) be extended into the Hawaiian
jurisdiction. A state cannot regulate or proscribe activities conducted in another
state or supervise the internal affairs of another state in any way, even though
the welfare or health of its citizens may be affected when they travel to that
state.” (Archibald v. Cinerama Hawaiian Hotels, Inc. (1977) 73 Cal.App.3d 152,
159 [140 Cal.Rptr. 599], internal citations omitted, disapproved on other grounds
in Koire v. Metro Car Wash (1985) 40 Cal.3d 24 [219 Cal.Rptr. 133, 707 P.2d
195].)
Secondary Sources
8 Witkin, Summary of California Law (11th ed. 2017) Constitutional Law, § 989 et
seq.
Gaab & Reese, California Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial Claims and
Defenses, Ch. 14(IV)-B, Ralph Civil Rights Act of 1976 - Elements, ¶ 14:940 (The
Rutter Group)
Cheng et al., Cal. Fair Housing and Public Accommodations § 914:2, 14:39 (The
Rutter Group)
11 California Forms of Pleading and Practice, Ch. 116, Civil Rights: Discrimination
in Business Establishments, § 116.80 (Matthew Bender)
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California Civil Practice: Civil Rights Litigation, §§ 3:1-3:15 (Thomson Reuters)
CACI No. 3063 CIVIL RIGHTS
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© Judicial Council of California.
